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Abstract 
This paper investigates how the EU’s externalisation of migration policy relates to the efforts at the 
global level to strengthen solidarity in the protection of refugees. Where the New York Declaration 
of 2016 stressed the need for a more equitable sharing of the responsibility for hosting and 
supporting refugees, the chapter questions whether the EU policies develop into this direction. The 
overview of the impact of migration deals with third countries, focusses on the human rights risks 
for migrants stuck in a transit countries or returned there. The chapter describes how these risks will 
increase with the watering down of the safe third country concepts in EU legislation. Based on the 
consequences of the EU-Turkey deal, the author argues that extending similar deals with African 
countries, would not only threat the protection standards of refugees, but also affect the 
responsibility taken for refugees by transit countries. Those countries tend to adopt the 
externalisation policy of the EU, including a restricted visa policy, readmission agreements and 
avoiding and allocating responsibility for refugees with as an ultimate consequence that refugees 
face obstacles in fleeing their country. This copying behaviour has also serious implications for 
African regional relations and mobility schemes, which can be seen as an unintended side-effect of 
EU’s policies. The author therefore argues that while the EU externalisation policy neglects the long-
term and global effects, it risks to affect the aim of the draft UN Global Compact on the refugees 
to strengthen solidarity on the global level 
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1. Introduction 
In the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants of September 2016, the 
EU Member States promised to contribute to ‘a more equitable sharing of the 
burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while 
taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources 
among states’.1 The EU developments on asylum however, both on the external 
and the internal level, raise the question if the EU really keeps up with this 
commitment. 
 On the internal level, an important threat to this equitable sharing on the 
global level is the redefinition of the safe third country concept, which Member 
States are about to agree upon during the negotiations on the Asylum Procedures 
Regulation. On the external level, the formal and informal agreements the EU 
concludes with third countries of transit are also likely to result in less instead of 
more burden sharing. An important aim behind both concepts is to reduce and 
discourage irregular migration to the EU, including those who seek protection. 
Whether or not this policy would de facto diminish EU’s responsibility for refugees, 
also depends on other performances such as resettlement and strengthening 
protection outside the EU’s territory. These developments nevertheless beg the 
question how EU’s internal and external safe third country policies will affect the 
global aims on protection for refugees, more specifically the equitable sharing 
of responsibility. The experiences with the EU-Turkey Statement will be guiding 
for answering this question. This Statement covers both the internal and external 
concepts: the Greek authorities are supposed to apply the safe third country 
concept to asylum requests of refugees coming from Turkey, and the Turkish 
authorities have promised to prevent migrants from departing and to readmit 
those who left the country. 
 The chapter will start with an analysis of the developments on the 
cooperation between the EU and third countries on migration, followed by an 
overview of the development of the EU safe third country concepts. In this context, 
the results of the EU-Turkey Statement will be analysed, especially concerning the 
human rights and protection level in both Greece and Turkey. As the EU envisages 
to adopt the same approach to other third countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia and 
Niger, the implications of such wider application will be assessed. The chapter 
will conclude on the consequences of EU’s migration policies for the responsibility 
sharing on the international level and the principle of the Global Compact. 
 
 
 
                                         
*  Tineke Strik is Associate Professor migration law at the Radboud University, the 
Netherlands. She is also member of the Dutch Senate and member of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe.  
1 UN General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 19 September 
2016, UN Doc A/RES/71/1, para 68. 
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2. The external dimension of EU migration policy 
2.1. The bumpy road to the external dimension 
During the last twenty years, the rapid development of both the internal and 
external EU migration policies has considerable common ground. Based on the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, EU norms offer rights to migrants and refugees who have 
arrived at the EU territory.2 At the same time, the EU created many instruments 
to prevent irregular arrival at its territory, such as common visa policy, carrier 
sanctions and FRONTEX, and to promote the return of third country nationals 
staying irregularly at the EU territory. Both aims increased the importance of 
cooperation with third countries on migration. 
 Initially the externalisation was limited to one-dimensional agreements, of 
which the readmission agreements were the most important instruments to combat 
irregular migration. In the nineties, many Member States concluded bilateral 
agreements with Middle and Eastern European countries to avoid mass 
immigration to their countries.3 In order to overcome the persistent hesitance of 
many other third countries, the Commission called upon the Member States to 
integrate readmission agreements in a comprehensive foreign policy and to offer 
more compensation to third countries through a common policy.4 In a controversial 
strategy document, the Austrian Presidency criticised in 1998 the failure to 
persuade third countries in readmitting migrants.5 It advised the EU to show its 
‘international and political muscular balls’ in order to gain cooperation by linking 
advantages such as visa liberalisation or trade benefits to return policy. As the 
Austrian proposal met severe public resistance (especially the division of the 
world into four concentric circles and the aim to limit the scope of the 1951 United 
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)), the 
Council did not adopt the paper. But in fact, the paper, to which the Commission 
had contributed, reflected the ideas of many Member States.6 The core message 
was retained: on the initiative of the Netherlands the Council installed a High 
Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration assigned to develop a 
comprehensive, cross-pillar common policy towards third countries which were of 
                                         
2 The scope of the Procedures Directive for instance, explicitly excludes embassies and 
consulates outside the EU territory, see Art 3(2) of the European Parliament and Council 
Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L180/60 (Procedures Directive). 
3 S. Lavenex, Safe third countries: extending the EU asylum and immigration policies to 
Central and East Europe (Central European University Press 1999) 76-82, 89. 
4 Commission, ‘Communication on immigration and asylum policies’ COM (94) 23 final, paras 
115 and 116. 
5 European Council, ‘Draft strategy paper on immigration and asylum’ (Council document 
9809/98, 1 July 1998). 
6 J. van Buuren and W. van der Schans, ‘Het Verdrag van Geneve in de terminale fase: Het 
Oostenrijkse strategiedocument’ in Dossier Europa: Het Europees asielbeleid in 2000 
(Uitgeverij de Papieren Tijger 1999) 1. 
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strategic interest.7 Although the Working Group was tasked with concentrating 
on the root causes for migration, it mainly focused on border controls and 
readmission obligations.8 
 The Member States were keen to Europeanise the cooperation with third 
countries in order to create a stronger negotiating leverage.9 It allowed the 
Member States to make use of the Community’s external powers in fields such as 
trade and development and merge national and EU budgets to serve their 
interests in the field of readmission.10  Under the ‘more for more’ principle, 
negotiations with third countries on migration control include various positive 
incentives for transit countries (e.g. trade benefits, visa liberalisation, direct 
financial support) to persuade them to strengthen their border controls, restrict 
their visa policy and readmit irregular migrants.11 The leverage conferred on the 
EU by the pre-accession and visa liberalization conditionality, but also by the 
Neighbourhood Policy, greatly facilitates cooperation on migration. The closer 
the ties with the EU, the more difficult for the third country not to sign for 
agreements on readmission or border control. However, this dictated adaptation 
creates the risk that the human rights of returnees or stranded refugees are 
subordinated to the aim of combating irregular migration. In serving their own 
interests, third countries may become extremely cooperative towards the EU 
without having the guarantees for migrants in place.12 
2.2. Transit countries 
EU Member States have increasingly shifted their focus from countries of origin 
to transit countries, especially to those sharing their borders with the EU. This fits 
in the aim to create a ‘buffer zone’ around its territory by committing its 
neighbouring countries to readmit migrants who have passed through their 
                                         
7 Council of the EU, ‘Presidency Conclusions. 2148th Council Meeting, General Affairs’ (Press 
Release 13677/98 (Presse 431), 6 December 1998) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_PRES-98-431_en.htm> accessed 5 May 2017; S. Peers, ‘Irregular migration and 
EU external relations’ in B. Bogusz et al. (eds), Irregular Immigration and Human Rights: 
Theoretical, European and International Perspectives (Brill 2004) 11. Cross-pillar Action Plans 
were made for Afghanistan and the neighbouring region, Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Iraq, and Albania and the neighbouring region. 
8 N. Coleman, European Readmission Policy. Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 23-24. 
9 G. Lahav and V. Guiraudon, ‘Comparative perspectives on border control: away from the 
border and outside the state’ in P. Andreas and T. Snyders (eds), The Wall around the West: 
State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers 2000) 55-79. 
10 Coleman (n 8) 55; G. Noll, Negotiating Asylum: the EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection 
and the Common Market of Deflection (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000) 206. 
11 See e.g. the prominent references on migration and border controls Commission, 
‘Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean Partners Report’ SWD (2015) 75 final. 
12 See the case of Albania in S. Dedja, ‘Human Rights in the EU Return Policy: the Case of the 
EU-Albania Relations’ (2012) 14 EJML 95-114. 
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territory on their way to the EU. In order to reduce the number of readmitted 
migrants to a minimum, those transit countries tend to restrict their incoming and 
outgoing migration from their neighbouring third countries and to the EU. This 
effect of readmission agreements was intended by the EU, which wanted ‘to make 
the Member States and third States take responsibility for the failings of their 
border control systems’.13 Preventing irregular entrance was thus more important 
than the readmission itself. 
 The strengthened border controls and restricted visa policies thus leads to 
more difficulties to enter the transit country, even if they need to flee from their 
own country or another transit country. This is currently the case at the Syrian-
Turkey border where Turkey only admits refugees in a life-threatening situation.14 
This effect not only undermines the right to leave a country but also the right to 
asylum.15 The chain-effect of border control and readmission agreements affects 
the mobility opportunities of migrants in their region as well. The cooperation of 
Niger and other African countries with the EU, has severely hampered the 
functioning of the ECOWAS free movement arrangements.16 There are ample 
indications that strengthened border controls also create risks for stability and 
livelihoods, limit protection opportunities and the right to seek asylum, promote 
repression and abuse against migrants and push migrants onto precarious 
routes.17 
 Returns on the basis of a readmission agreement entails the risk that an 
undocumented migrant is refused access to basic social needs in the transit 
country. Partner countries of the EU may agree to readmit them, but not with the 
intention to take actual responsibility for them. By concluding readmission 
agreements with other transit countries, they aim to immediately transfer this 
responsibility.18 For this reason, many readmission agreements with the EU include 
a clause that the obligations regarding non-citizens are only applicable after a 
                                         
13 Council of the EU, ‘Intensifying cooperation between CIREFI and Europol in the field of 
illegal migration and related issues’ (Council document 13084/01, 31 October 2001) 9. 
See F. Trauner and I. Kruse, ‘EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: 
Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the Neighbourhood’ (2008) 290 CEPS 
Working Document. 
14 Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Turkey/Syria: Border Guards Shoot, Block Fleeing Syrians’ 
(3 February 2018)  
 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/03/turkey/syria-border-guards-shoot-block-
fleeing-syrians> accessed 16 July 2018. 
15 Art 12(2) of 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Art 13(2) 
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
16 F. Molenaar et al., ‘A line in the sand. Roadmap for sustainable migration management in 
Agadez’ (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, CRU Report, October 
2017). 
17 J. Bergmann et al., ‘Protection Fallout. How Increasing Capacity for Border Management 
Affects Migrants’ Vulnerabilities in Niger and Mali’ (Global Public Policy Institute, 
November 2017). 
18 T. Balzacq, ‘The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Tools, Processes, 
Outcomes’ (2008) 303 CEPS Working Document. 
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number of years after the conclusion of the agreement.19 This potential chain of 
transit threatens the principle of human dignity as enshrined in international law, 
in particular if the migrant is unable to return to his home country.20 Bearing in 
mind this risk of a (legal) limbo situation for the returnee in a transit country, the 
Commission urged Member States in 2011 to give priority to returning 
undocumented migrants to their country of origin.21 The Member States however 
did not follow up the Commission’s advice to be reticent to include third country 
nationals in readmission agreements in order to ease negotiations.22 If the return 
takes place in the context of the safe third country concept, the readmitted 
refugee will depend on the effectiveness of the asylum system in the third country. 
This impact will be described later. 
 Despite these human rights implications, readmission agreements do not 
require a certain protection level to be in place. Human rights standards are not 
included in the criteria for entering into cooperation with a third country, and 
there is no human rights impact assessment undertaken prior to the conclusion of 
a readmission agreement. As cooperation on border control has its legal 
constrains, these human rights considerations have led to a ‘cat-and-mouse game’ 
between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Member States of the 
Council of Europe. In its landmark judgment Hirsi v Italy, the Court convicted Italy 
for its push back operations in the international waters in cooperation with Libya. 
Automatic returns (push back operations) without any individual assessment and 
the possibility of legal redress constitute a violation of Articles 3 and 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 4 of the Protocol no 4 
to the Convention.23 The Court made clear that Member States exercising 
effective control over migrants are bound by the obligations of the ECHR, even 
if this control takes place outside their territory. Since then, Member States tend 
to circumvent their responsibility with creative interpretations of their jurisdiction 
and territory. In a judgment on the automatic return of sub-Saharan migrants by 
the Spanish government to Morocco, the ECtHR however recalled its jurisdiction 
                                         
19 See Art 24(3) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey 
on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation [2014] OJ L134/3. 
20 See the UDHR, Preamble and Art 1, but more concretely related to social rights Arts 22 
and 23. See also C. McCrudden, ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ 
(2008) 19 EJIL 655-724. 
21 Commission, ‘Communication on the evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements’ COM (2011) 
76 final, recommendation no 8: ‘(…) In those cases [of readmission of third country 
nationals, TS] the EU should also explicitly state that, as a matter of principle, it will always 
first try to readmit a person to his/her country of origin. The EU should also focus more its 
readmission strategy towards important countries of origin’. 
22 Ibid., recommendation no 8: ‘The current approach should be revised. As a rule, future 
negotiating directives should not cover third country nationals, hence there would not be a 
need for important incentives. Only in cases where the country concerned, due to its 
geographical position relative to the EU (direct neighbours, some Mediterranean countries) 
and where exists a big potential risk of irregular migration transiting its territory to the EU, 
the TCN clause should be included and only when appropriate incentives are offered (…)’. 
23 Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012). 
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as established in the Hirsi judgement and made clear that Member States cannot 
escape their responsibility while construing their jurisdiction in a certain way. 
Member States are hence not allowed to move their borders inwards in order to 
prevent asylum seekers from making an asylum claim.24 The tendency of Member 
States to delegate their action to third countries raises serious questions of their 
responsibility if this bilateral cooperation has clearly resulted in human rights 
violations. The Court has not yet ruled on situations in which a neighbouring 
country, which is not a party to the Convention, pulls back migrants from the 
border on the request of a party to the Convention. Not to assume responsibility 
would imply that Member States can easily escape their obligations under the 
ECHR by simply letting third parties ‘do the job’. Such an outcome would clearly 
undermine the effectiveness of the Convention. A new case filed by the Global 
Legal Action Network (GLAN) and the Association for Juridical Studies on 
Immigration (ASGI) with the Court at the beginning of May 2018 may have direct 
consequences of EU externalisation policies.25 It concerns seventeen survivors of a 
fatal incident in which a boat carrying migrants found itself in distress off the 
coast of Libya: the applicants included the surviving parents of two children who 
died in the incident. The submission makes use of evidence compiled by a Forensic 
Oceanography and a detailed reconstruction of the incident and the policies that 
contributed to it.26 
2.3. Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
The need for more incentives for partner countries begged for a more 
comprehensive approach, which led to the adoption of the Global Approach to 
Migration (GAM) in 2005.27 The GAM aimed to address the root causes of 
migration and prioritise the rights of migrants instead of the security concerns of 
the Member States. In 2011, the EU added the term ‘mobility’. The Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) serves as a framework for 
dialogue and cooperation with third countries in the field of migration and 
development. The GAMM structure, meant to safeguard a coherent internal and 
                                         
24 See C. Gortazár Rotaeche and N. Ferré Trad, ‘A cold shower for Spain-hot returns from 
Melilla to Morocco: ND and NT v Spain ECtHR, 3 October 2017’ (EU Migration Law Blog, 
20 October 2017) <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-cold-shower-for-spain-hot-returns-
from-melilla-to-morocco-n-d-and-n-t-v-spain-ecthr-3-october-2017/> accessed 16 July 
2018; A. Pijnenburg, ‘Is ND and NT v Spain the new Hirsi?’ (EJIL Talk, 17 October 2017) 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-n-d-and-n-t-v-spain-the-new-hirsi/> accessed 16 July 2018. 
25 Human Rights at Sea, ‘Legal action against Italy over its coordination of Libyan Coast 
Guard pull-backs resulting in migrant deaths and abuse’ (Press Release, 8 May 2018) 
<https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/2018/05/08/legal-action-before-the-ecthr-
against-italy-over-its-coordination-of-libyan-coast-guard-pull-backs-resulting-in-migrant-
deaths-and-abuse/> accessed 16 July 2018. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Commission, ‘Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: first follow-up 
to Hampton Court’ (Communication) COM (2005) 621 final, adopted by the European 
Council of 15/16 December 2005. 
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external migration policy, is characterised by four pillars, which the Commission 
considers as ‘equally important’.28 These pillars are: 1) Better organizing legal 
migration and fostering well-managed mobility; 2) Preventing and combating 
irregular migration; 3) Maximizing the development impact of migration; and 4) 
Promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of 
asylum. The pillars intersect on the two following principles: first, the notion of a 
mutual beneficial partnership with non-EU partner countries, based on equality, 
and second, the principle that the GAMM should be migrant-centred, as ‘the 
migrant is at the core of the analysis and all action and that he must be 
empowered to gain access to safe mobility’.29 From that perspective, the human 
rights of migrants are marked as a cross-cutting issue, with the aim to strengthen 
‘respect for fundamental rights and the human rights of migrants in source, transit 
and destination countries alike’.30 These two principles emphasise the overall aim 
of the GAMM to create a ‘win-win-win’ situation, with benefits for EU Member 
States, partner countries, and migrants. 
 The European Agenda on Migration (EAM) that was formulated in the light 
of Europe’s migration-management crisis in 2015 strengthens the focus on the 
external dimension of EU’s migration policy.31 The Commission, while emphasising 
the lack of cooperation by the partner countries, launched proposals to enhance 
their willingness to cooperate. This rather one-sided approach contrasts with its 
evaluation of the readmission agreements of 2011, where it raised concerns on 
the human rights implications of readmitting migrants to transit countries.32 
The perception of partner countries as the ‘black sheep’ of the external dimension, 
is also reflected in the most recent initiative of the previously mentioned New 
Partnership Framework with third countries.33 This framework aims to adopt tailor 
made ‘compacts’ with priority partner countries, in which all instruments, tools and 
leverage are put together, ‘to better manage migration in full respect of our 
humanitarian and human rights obligations’.34 Here the principle of conditionality 
has been put to the centre of the policy, implying that the economic support of 
third countries depends on their performances on readmission and border control. 
The ‘more for more’ principle would therefore be complemented with the ‘less for 
less’ principle and strengthened by the use of all EU policy areas, with the 
exception of humanitarian aid.35 The EU has put this approach to the test while 
                                         
28 Commission, ‘The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (Communication) COM 
(2011) 743 final. 
29 Ibid., 4. 
30 Ibid., 7. 
31 Commission, ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ (Communication) COM (2015) 240 final. 
32 ‘Communication on the Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements’ (n 21). 
33 Commission, ‘Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third 
countries under the European Agenda on Migration’ COM (2016) 385 final, 2-3. 
34 Ibid., 6. 
35 Ibid., 2-3. 
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negotiating with 16 priority countries on a country package.36 Although this 
framework is built on the GAMM pillars, it reveals that ‘a solution to the irregular 
and uncontrolled movement of people is a priority for the Union as a whole’.37 
This prioritisation is likely to affect the claimed equality of the four pillars, but 
also the aim of a coherent and effective EU foreign policy, if this migration 
priority predominates all other policy objectives. 
 This prioritisation also leads to concerns on the implementation of the 
financing instruments under the Partnership Framework on Migration. A prominent 
one is the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), as established during the 
Valetta Summit.38 Despite the labelling as an emergency instrument, most of the 
resources of the EUTF consist of Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is 
intended to fund long-term development programmes. Through this fund, a 
significant part of the European budget for development aid is channelled 
towards practices of migration management, border control, including the support 
of the Libyan Coast Guard intercepting migrants to take them back to horrible 
places of detention.39 
2.3.1. Border control and human rights 
The implementation of the GAMM exposes a tension between the different 
pillars. Measures on border controls usually have an immediate impact, while 
improvement of protection standards is a long-term investment. Paradoxically, 
evaluators conclude that improvements of human rights seems to take shape on a 
more ad hoc basis, whilst cooperation on border controls is treated as a structural 
matter, receiving significantly more funding.40 This creates the risk that migrants, 
including refugees are stranded in a transit countries without having protecting 
authorities to turn to. Amnesty International evidenced that ‘the demands being 
placed on third countries to prevent irregular departures to Europe put refugees, 
                                         
36 Ibid., 8. These selected countries are Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan. 
37 Ibid., 3. 
38 Agreement Establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and 
Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Constitutive Agreement) and Its Internal Rules between the European Commission and 
Kingdom of Spain (Valetta, 2015) (Agreement establishing the EUTF). 
39 S. Carrera et al., ‘Oversight and Management of the EU Trust Funds. Democratic 
Accountability Challenges and Promising Practices’ (Study for the European Parliament, 
February 2018). See for the support of the Libyan Coastguard Annex IV to the Agreement 
establishing the EUTF (n 35). 
40 P. García Andrade, I. Martín, and S. Mananashvili, ‘EU Cooperation with Third Countries in 
the field of Migration’ (Study for the LIBE Committee no PE536, 2015). 
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asylum-seekers and migrants in those countries at risk of prolonged and arbitrary 
detention, refoulement, and ill-treatment’.41 
 For these reasons it is highly problematic that a conditionality between 
cooperation and certain standards on protection and human rights is failing, 
especially regarding partner countries with notorious negative human rights 
records.42 As a debate on the criteria on protection standards for entering into a 
cooperation on migration is failing, the question on which standards should apply 
in the partner country is still not answered. The EU does not employ independent 
and objective evaluation systems to scrutinise the lawfulness of the implementation 
of these rights-sensitive migration policies, and to ensure access by individuals to 
effective remedies in cases of alleged fundamental rights violations.43 
Furthermore, a suspension mechanism is lacking for situations in which a transit 
country would fall short of crucial standards. The Parliamentary Assembly has 
called upon the EU to establish those mechanisms as a way to ensure that the EU 
foreign policy is coherent with the EU’s fundamental rights and values.44 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants has criticised the 
GAMM for: 
lack[ing] transparency and clarity in the substantive contents of its multiple 
and complex elements. Additionally, many agreements reached in the 
framework of the Approach have weak standing within international law 
and generally lack monitoring and accountability measures, which allow for 
power imbalances between countries and for the politics of the day to 
determine implementation. There are few signs that mobility partnerships 
have resulted in additional human rights or development benefits, as 
projects have unclear specifications and outcomes. The overall focus on 
security and the lack of policy coherence within the Approach as a whole 
creates a risk that any benefits arising from human rights and development 
                                         
41 Amnesty International, ‘The human cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights violations against 
migrants and refugees at Europe’s borders’ (2014) 
<https://www.amnesty.ch/de/themen/asyl-und-migration/festung-
europa/dok/2015/die-kampagne-sos-europa/bericht-the-human-cost-of-fortress-
Europe> accessed 5 May 2017; see also Doctors without Borders, ‘Violence, Vulnerability 
and Migration: Trapped at the Gates of Europe. A report on the situation of sub-Saharan 
migrants in an irregular situation in Morocco’ (March 2013) 
<https://www.msf.org.uk/sites/uk/files/Migration_Morocco_2013_201303132441.pdf
> accessed 5 May 2017. 
42 A. Roig and T.Huddleston, ‘EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-evaluation of the Political 
Impasse’ (2007) 9 EJML 363-387. 
43 S. Carrera, ‘The EU’s Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern 
Mediterranean: Filling the Gaps in the Global Approach to Migration’ (2011) CEPS Papers 
in Liberty and Security in Europe; J.P. Cassarino, Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on 
Readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area (The Middle East Institute 2010); García 
Andrade, Martín, and Mananashvili (n 37). 
44 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Human rights impact of the “external 
dimension” of European Union asylum and migration policy: out of sight, out of rights?’ 
(Report by T. Strik, Document 14575, 27 June 2018). 
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projects will be overshadowed by the secondary effects of more security-
focused policies.45 
Another threat to the effective protection of rights under the Convention is the 
shift from legally-defined procedures with formal commitments to the use of 
informal tools which enable practical cooperation in migration control. Although 
these informal arrangements are often not intended to create legal obligations 
under international law, they do have serious implications for the distribution of 
responsibility between states and migrants’ right to protection. The rights of 
asylum seekers are inherently depended on the possibility to have human rights 
violations assessed by a court, but without any formal agreements in place, it 
becomes very difficult to establish at the outset whether a state or organisation 
was engaged in extraterritorial jurisdiction and whether it actually agreed with 
a third state to delegate certain functions or acts. This ‘informalisation’ of the 
external cooperation also hampers the necessary transparency and democratic 
control. 
3. The internal dimension of EU migration policy 
3.1. Safe third country concepts as instruments for externalisation 
Since the Europeanisation of the safe third country concepts, a parallel 
development can be observed with more obligations for Member States and less 
safeguards for asylum seekers. With the adoption of the Procedures Directive, 
the EU Member States have Europeanised three safe third country concepts which 
are applicable towards transit countries: the first country of asylum, the safe third 
country and the European safe third country. After a brief overview of the criteria 
for these concepts, it will be analysed below how they are developing into 
instruments applicable for externalised migration policy. 
3.1.1. Safe third country 
The current rules on a safe third country are laid down in Article 38 of the 
Procedures Directive. An asylum request can be declared inadmissible, which 
implies that no status determination takes place.46 Such a decision is only allowed 
if the third country meets the criteria of Article 38 (1) of the Directive, which cover 
the criteria of Article 3 of ECHR and serious harm as defined in the Qualification 
Directive, as well as Article 1 and 33 of Refugee Convention. Member States 
                                         
45 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants: Banking on mobility over a generation: follow-up to the regional study on the 
management of the external borders of the European Union and its impact on the human 
rights of migrants’ (UN Document A/HRC/29/36, 8 May 2015) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/5576e3ba4.html> accessed 5 May 2017. 
46 Art 33(2)(c) Procedures Directive (n 2). 
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have to lay down national rules on the required connection between the asylum 
seeker and the safe third country as well as on the method of assessment.47 This 
assessment may entail the assessment of the safety for a specific asylum seeker, 
but could also be limited to a general judgement of a country. The asylum seeker 
must be offered the opportunity to challenge the presumption of safety and the 
assumed connection with the third country. If the asylum seeker is not admitted to 
the third country, the Member States will have to admit the person to the regular 
asylum procedure. 
3.1.2. First country of asylum 
According to Article 35 Procedures Directive, a country can be considered as a 
first country of asylum for a particular applicant if this person has been 
recognised as a refugee in that country, and is still able to receive this protection, 
or if the country will guarantee sufficient protection otherwise, including non-
refoulement. While assessing the safety of the third country, Member States may 
use the criteria of a safe third country, as laid down in Article 38(1) of the 
Procedures Directive. The same provision was laid down in Article 26 of Directive 
2005/85. During the negotiations on that directive, UNHCR had unsuccessfully 
advocated to replace the term ‘sufficient protection’ with the internationally 
recognised term ‘effective protection’. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam have chosen 
to read sufficient as effective: according to them, the concept can only be applied 
if the receiving country offers effective protection. 
 A big difference between the concepts of safe third country and first 
country of asylum, is that the asylum seeker already enjoyed protection or 
another form of legal residence in the first country of asylum, which was not the 
case in the safe third country. For the latter, more proof needs to be gathered if 
the protection will be granted. Legomsky considers it as a gradual difference.48 
Despite these differences many scholars argue that they have to fulfil more or 
less the same criteria according to international law.49 In both cases the expelling 
country is bound by the non-refoulement principle and has to guarantee that the 
receiving country will grant certain additional rights to the refugee. It is however 
difficult to argue from the texts in the Directive that the term ‘sufficient protection’ 
requires the full protection of the Refugee Convention. The last paragraph of 
Article 35(b) only suggests that Member States take into account the criteria of 
Article 38(1), which is far from obliging them to a strict application of Article 38. 
                                         
47 Ibid., Art 38(2). 
48 S.H. Legomsky, ‘Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third 
Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection’ (2003) 15 IJRL 571. 
49 G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (OUP 2007) 393; 
Legomsky (n 45) 570; R. Hofmann and T. Löhr, ‘Introduction to Chapter V’ in A. Zimmermann 
(ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol (OUP 
2011) 1114. 
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3.1.3. European safe third country 
The most far-reaching concept of safe countries is the one on European safe 
countries, as it waives the procedural safeguards of Chapter II of the Directive. 
This concept, enshrined in Article 39, allows Member States to not or not fully 
examine the asylum claim of a migrant who irregularly enters their country 
directly from a safe third country which is a member of the Council of Europe. It 
can be applied in case this country has ratified both the Refugee Convention 
(without geographical limitations) and the ECHR and actually observes those 
instruments. 
3.2. Safe third country concept in line with international standards? 
The Directive has provoked a debate, fuelled by the EU-Turkey Statement of 
March 2016, on whether or not the safe third country should have ratified the 
Refugee Convention, and on the level of protection that this country should need 
to guarantee. The requirement that the person must have the possibility to request 
a refugee status in my view already implies ratification. Most scholars agree that 
the protection offered by the third country should be effective.50 But how should 
‘effective protection’ be defined? Does it mean full protection, including all 
standards of the Refugee Convention, or the protection that needs to be granted 
to asylum seekers? During the asylum procedure, a refugee has the right to non-
refoulement, non-discrimination, access to justice, impunity for irregular entrance, 
a right to identity documents and the right to a certain amount of free movement. 
Hathaway and Legomsky hold the view that only this limited number of rights 
need to be safeguarded in the third country.51 According to Hathaway, the 
Refugee Convention does not impose conditions on the transfer of the duty to 
protect.52 According to his line of reasoning, it would only be required that the 
third country national will not lose his rights as an asylum seeker through the 
allocation. Legomsky shares this view but with the argument that the expelling 
country, which has not yet granted the refugee status, cannot anticipate to the 
situation that the third country will grant this status.53 It can therefore not be 
                                         
50 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 46) 393-397; J. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under 
International Law (CUP 2005) 332; S. Peers and N. Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law. 
Text and Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 399; see also UNHCR in 2016 in 
its response to the EU-Turkey deal: ‘Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers 
and refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the 
Migration Crisis under the safe third country and first country of asylum concept’ (UNHCR 
2016); UNHCR, Executive Committee, ‘Problem of Refugees and Asylum-seekers who move 
in an irregular manner from a country in which they had already found protection. No 58 
(XL) 1989’ (UNGA Document 12A, A/44/12/Add.1, 13 October 1989); UNHCR, Executive 
Committee, ‘Conclusion on International Protection. No 85 (XLIX) 1998’ (UNGA Document 
12A, A/53/12/Add.1, 9 October 1998). 
51 Hathaway (n 47) 323; Legomsky (n 45) 645. 
52 Hathaway (n 47) 333. 
53 Legomsky (n 45) 645. 
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expected that the third country will grant more rights to the refugee than it enjoys 
in the Member State where he resides as an asylum seeker. 
 The British House of Lords holds even a more minimalist view: ‘[t]he 
Convention is directed to a very important but very simple and very practical 
end, preventing the return of applicants to places where they will or may suffer 
persecution. Legal niceties and refinements should not be allowed to obstruct that 
purpose’.54 
 These positions have in common that they do not differentiate between the 
legal position of an asylum seeker, who is still prior to or in the process of status 
determination, and the position of a refugee, who has been recognized and given 
the right to build a future in the country. The latter situation requires the enjoyment 
of all standards of the Refugee Convention, including social rights such as the right 
to education, work, integration and accommodation. If the transfer would imply 
that the refugee cannot invoke those rights in neither the sending nor the receiving 
country, the aim of the Convention to offer durable protection would be 
undermined. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the Convention, the 
readmitting country needs to assure that in case the asylum seeker needs 
protection, he will be treated in accordance with all obligations of the Refugee 
Convention.55 One could add to these arguments that the interpretation by 
UNHCR, mandated with supervising compliance with the Refugee Convention, 
should be guiding or at least be treated as relevant. 
3.3. Turkey as a safe third country? 
With the conclusion of the EU-Turkey Statement, the debate on the requirements 
for applying the safe third country concept became extremely relevant.56 In the 
build-up to the EU-Turkey Statement, the European Council and the Commission 
began to encourage the Member States to apply the safe third country concept 
to Turkey.57 In its proposals for the further harmonisation of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) published later that year, the Commission 
                                         
54 UK House of Lords, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Yogathas (36 
UKHL, 17 October 2002). 
55 See also Hofmann and Löhr (n 46) 1113. 
56 For an explanation on the EU-Turkey Statement, see: K. Groenendijk, ‘Insights from 
agreements on migration between the EU and Turkey’, in: Sergio Carrera, Juan Santos 
Vara & Tineke Strik (eds), Constitutionalising the External Dimensions of EU Migration 
Policies in Times of Crisis: Legality, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Reconsidered, 2019 
Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar. 
57 Commission, ‘EU-Turkey joint action plan’ (Press Release, 15 October 2015) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_it.htm> accessed 5 May 2017; 
European Council, ‘Statement of the EU Heads of State or Government, 7 March 2016’ 
(Press Release 807/16, 8 March 2016)  
 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/08/eu-turkey-
meeting-statement/> accessed 5 May 2017; Commission, ‘Communication on the next 
operational steps in EU-Turkey cooperation in the field of migration’ COM (2016) 166 
final. 
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proposed to make the use of the safe third country concept mandatory.58 Turkey 
still holds its geographical limitation to the Refugee Convention and besides the 
question on the need for ratification, many reports express doubts if the 
temporary protection status of Syrians and the treatment of non-Syrians meets 
the standards of the Refugee Convention. In its Resolution 2109 (2016) the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe found that returns of asylum 
seekers of any nationality to Turkey as a safe third country was contrary to EU 
and/or international law, and that returns of Syrian asylum seekers to Turkey as 
a ‘first country of asylum’ may be contrary to EU and/or international law. The 
Assembly referred to the many obstacles for asylum seekers to have access to 
the procedure due to the rules a lack of capacity and appropriate reception 
conditions, the limited access for Syrian refugees to housing, primary education, 
the labour market and livelihood and the allegations of deportation, unlawful 
detention and bad detention conditions.59 
  During the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, organisations kept 
on reporting about the precarious position of refugees and asylum seekers. With 
a view to immediate deportation, readmitted migrants are sent to Turkish removal 
centres where they have very limited to no access to lawyers, UNHCR, NGOs, or 
to the asylum procedure.60 Readmitted Syrians have been transferred to de facto 
closed camps where they are locked in cells and have very limited communication 
opportunities and access to the outside world.61 The expressed concerns not only 
relate to the readmitted refugees. Syrian refugees receiving temporary 
protection in Turkey live in extreme poverty, due to the combination of limited 
access to social welfare systems and to the labour market, were a quota system 
for Syrian refugees is applied and employers requesting for a working permit 
face long and expensive procedures. Many of them are exposed to exploitation 
at the informal labour market, including a substantial number of Syrian children.  
                                         
58 See Commission, ‘Proposal for the Regulation establishing a common procedure for 
international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU’ COM (2016) 
467 final;  COM (2016) 85 final; and Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member States responsible for examining 
an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (recast)’ COM(2016) 270 final (‘Proposal for a 
reform of the Dublin III Regulation’). 
59 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2016(2109) of 20 April 2016 on 
the situation of refugees and migrants under the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016; 
see also Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ‘The situation of refugees and migrants 
under the under the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016’ (Report by T. Strik, Document 
14028, 19 April 2016). 
60 O. Ulusoy and H. Battjes, ‘Situation of Readmitted Migrants and Refugees from Greece to 
Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement’ (2017) 15 VU Migration Law Series. 
61 Report of the fact-finding mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on migration and refugees, 30 May – 4 June 
2016, 10 August 2016, SG/Inf(2016)29; GUE/NGL Group, ‘What Merkel, Tusk and 
Timmermans should have seen during their visit to Turkey’ (Report from GUE/NGL 
Delegation to Turkey, 2-4 May 2016). 
Tineke Strik 
 17 
Soon after the EU-Turkey Statement had been concluded, the Turkish government 
closed its Syrian land border for Syrian refugees: since then only refugees in a 
life-threatening situation are admitted to the territory. The government has even 
created a ‘safe zone’ in Northern Syria, where Syrian refugees are returned to; 
according the Turkish authorities on a voluntary basis.62 This makes it practically 
very difficult or even impossible for Syrian refugees to receive the protection 
they are entitled in the context of Article 3 of ECHR and the Refugee Convention. 
The state of emergency that applies since the coup attempt of summer 2016, also 
has its repercussions for refugees and asylum seekers, as it has significantly 
reduced their safeguards against refoulement.63 The Turkish Executive Decree 
676/201664 has abolished the automatic suspensive effect of an appeal against 
removal orders for individuals considered to constitute a ‘threat to public order, 
security and health’ or regarded as somehow associated with ‘terrorist 
organizations’. Although the reason for such labelling is not substantiated, 
administrative authorities and courts do not question its validity. In such cases, 
removal orders can be issued even when the person concerned is a recognized 
refugee or a registered asylum-seeker. The only instance being able to stop the 
deportation is the constitutional court. 
3.4. The ‘hotspot approach’ 
As a consequence of the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU Member States have tasked 
Greece to put the notion of Turkey as a safe third country to the test. Up until 
now however, Greece has not designated Turkey as a safe third country. It has 
adopted the concepts of safe third country and first country of asylum by a 
Presidential Decree, but it has not laid down any rules on the methodology to 
define a country as such, nor has it applied the concept up until the EU-Turkey 
Statement.65 Greece has long struggled with a defective asylum system. Many 
fundamental problems still persisted in 2016, including inadequate provision of 
information to asylum seekers; persistent obstacles to accessing the asylum 
procedure; long delays in the asylum procedure, including a persistent backlog 
of applications; the capacity of the asylum service, including failure to open 
planned regional offices and under-staffing; persistent delays in clearing the 
backlog of appeals under previous procedures; and the structure and rules of 
procedure of the Appeals Authority and its Appeals Committees.66 In April 2017, 
                                         
62 ‘Human rights impact of the “external dimension” of European Union asylum and migration 
policy: out of sight, out of rights?’ (n 41), para 4.1. 
63 Amnesty International, ‘Refugees at heightened risk of refoulement under Turkey’s state of 
emergency’ (Public Statement EUR 44/7157/2017, 22 September 2017). 
64 Turkey, Executive Decree 676/2016 (29 October 2016). 
65 Greece, Presidential Decree 90/08 (11 July 2008). See Y. Masouridou and E. Kyprioti, 
‘The EU-Turkey Statement and the Greek Hotspots’ (The Greens/European Free Alliance of 
the European Parliament, June 2018). 
66 UNHCR, ‘Greece as a Country of Asylum – UNHCR’s Recommendations’ (6 April 2015) 
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the Greek Ombudsman issued a detailed, damning report entitled ‘Migration 
Flows and Refugee Protection: Administrative Challenges and Human Rights 
Issues’. This report confirmed the UNHCR’s concerns and even expanded on them 
in relation to, for example, poor conditions in the island hotspots and other 
accommodation facilities; deficiencies in the provision of food and health-care to 
asylum seekers; ineffective access to education; and, at great length, inadequate 
administrative co-ordination and planning, deficient legislative and regulatory 
frameworks and the Greek State’s inability to absorb the available EU 
financing.67 Those deficiencies were known to the EU: in its progress report of 
September 2017, the Commission repeated its concerns about the reception 
conditions of refugees on the overcrowded Greek islands, where the number of 
arrivals exceeds the number of departure.68 
 Although the Commission tried hard to convince the Greek authorities that 
EU law requirements for returns to Turkey are satisfied, only 2,383 (out of 20,953 
Syrians arrived at the Greek islands since the EU-Turkey Statement) asylum 
requests had been declared inadmissible on the basis of the safe third country 
concept during the first two years after the Statement.69 These inadmissible 
decisions were based on written assurances from the Turkish government that 
readmitted Syrian refugees would have access to temporary protection and that 
it would readmit non-Syrians as well.70 In several appeal cases against decisions 
on inadmissibility, the Greek Asylum Appeals Committee on Lesvos found that the 
temporary protection for Syrian refugees in Turkey did not offer rights equivalent 
to those guaranteed by the Refugee Convention, referring to reports from NGOs, 
                                         
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
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UNHCR and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.71 In response 
to these critical assessments, the Greek authorities have changed the composition 
of the Appeals Committee by reducing the number of independent experts. 
 On 22 September 2017, the Greek Council of State found that the 
decisions of the Appeals Committees holding that Turkey is a safe third country 
for the two applicants involved were reasonable.72 The Council of State took the 
view that ratification of the Geneva Convention was not required by Article 38, 
while contrasting this provision to the European safe third country provision of 
Article 39 where ratification is an explicit criterion. The Court was satisfied with 
‘sufficient protection’ of certain fundamental rights of refugees, such as inter alia 
the right to health care and employment.73 It stipulated that the UNHCR reading 
of the safe third country concept did not influence its decision, as the Convention 
itself does not grant UNHCR the power of ‘authentic interpretation’ of the Geneva 
Convention, nor does EU law acknowledge UNHCR’s competence to formulate 
binding opinions on the content of legal concepts in the acquis.74 The Council of 
State finally decided not to refer the cases to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) to determine the question as to whether Turkey can be considered 
a safe third country by a narrow majority of 13 votes to 12. The dissenting 
opinion of 12 judges highlighted the existence of reasonable doubt on a number 
of issues, including the requirement of ratification of the Geneva Convention 
without geographical limitation, the compliance of Turkish temporary protection 
with the requirement of being ‘in accordance with the Geneva Convention’, and 
the requisite degree of connection between the applicant and safe third 
country.75 The dissenting opinion refers to the Turkish repressive regime after 
failed coup of 15 July 2016, in which ‘fundamental rights and liberties are openly 
violated, judicial independence has been dismantled (…)’.76 It is striking that the 
Council of State did not refer to the worsening human rights situation in Turkey at 
all. 
 Although the resistance within the Greek asylum system has reduced in 
favour of the EU position, the EU-Turkey Statement has not been effective in 
numbers of readmission. As of 31 May 2018, only 2224 migrants had been 
                                         
71 See, for example, ‘What Merkel, Tusk and Timmermans should have seen during their visit 
to Turkey’ (n 58); HRW, ‘EU/Greece: First Turkey Deportations Riddled With Abuse’ (19 
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returned from Greece to Turkey since the EU-Turkey Statement was concluded.77 
On 7 June of that year, the Turkish government suspended the bilateral 
readmission agreement between Turkey and Greece following Greece’s release 
into protective custody of four military servicemen that Ankara wants extradited 
in order to prosecute them for taking part in the 2016 coup attempt. This shows 
how deals on migration create the risk of migrants being used as a tool in a 
political conflict. Despite the failing prospect on return and the annulment of the 
geographical restriction of asylum seekers by the Greek Council of State, the 
asylum seekers continue to be contained on the islands.78 
4. The future of the EU safe third country concept 
4.1. The Regulation on safe third country concepts 
The proposal for the regulation, released in July 2016, clearly reflects one of the 
objectives of concluding migration deals with third countries: the transfer of 
responsibility for refugees.79 The four main changes in the safe third country 
concept are the imperative wording of the provision, the relaxation of the criteria 
for a safe third country, the designation of third countries as safe at the EU level 
and Europeanisation of the criteria for the required connection between the 
asylum seeker and the third country. Member States are left no discretion not to 
apply the safe third country concept, but they are allowed to designate third 
countries as safe in addition to the common EU list of safe third countries, unless 
the Commission objects to it.80 According to the Commission, the concept should 
also be applied before determining the responsible Member States in the 
framework of the Dublin Regulation, which means that family members stranded 
in another Member State, are to be sent back outside the EU territory where they 
have to apply for family reunification.81 That would make the provisions on family 
unity in the Dublin Regulation in many cases meaningless. 
 The criteria no longer include the possibility to request refugee status or 
full protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention. Article 45(1)(e) 
requires the possibility to receive protection in accordance with the substantive 
standards of the Refugee Convention or sufficient protection as defined in the first 
country of asylum concept. This wording seems to suggest that there are three 
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categories of protective standards: first – the basic criteria on non-refoulement, 
no risk of harm and no threat to life and liberty, as laid down in sub-paragraphs 
‘a’ to ‘d’ which should always be guaranteed; second – substantive standards as 
referred to in sub-paragraph ‘e’; and third – the criteria for sufficient protection 
as referred to in Article 44(2) within the context of the first country of asylum 
concept.82 The presentation of the latter two as a choice, implies a clear 
distinction. That the sufficient protection criteria refer to rights necessary to settle 
and build a future in a country, could imply that the substantive safeguards only 
refer to the rights guaranteed to asylum seekers. This limited definition, which 
confirm the reasoning by Hathaway and Legomsky, would mean that refugees 
cannot invoke the full protection of the Refugee Convention in any country. They 
might try this once transferred to the safe third country, but the Procedures 
Directive does not guarantee that this country offers more than the minimum 
protection against persecution, serious harm and refoulement, and the more 
procedural guarantees of the Convention such as impunity of irregular entrance. 
As the ratification of the Convention is excluded from the conditions, it is doubtful 
if they can invoke these rights at all, and rely on the supervisory role of UNHCR. 
Besides this significant widened scope of a safe third country concept, Member 
States are also given a large margin of appreciation with regard to the required 
connection: it should be ‘reasonable’ for the person to go to that country. This 
reason could exist ‘if he transited through that country which is geographically 
close to his country of origin’.83 Although these grounds are not supposed to be 
exhaustive, the formulation seems to imply that these two criteria are cumulative. 
The concept can also be applied to unaccompanied minors under the condition 
that the authorities of the third country confirm they will take him in charge and 
that he will immediately have access to protection. On 22-23 June 2017, the 
European Council agreed that: 
in order to enhance cooperation with third countries and prevent new crises, 
the 'safe third country' concept should be aligned with the effective 
requirements arising from the Geneva Convention and EU primary law, 
while respecting the competences of the EU and the Member States under 
the Treaties. In this context, the European Council calls for work on an EU list 
of safe third countries to be taken forward (...). The European Council invites 
the Council to continue negotiations on this basis and amend the legislative 
proposals as necessary, with the active help of the Commission.84 
The call for amending instead of adopting the proposal, suggests that the 
Member States are far from agreement. The expressed aim of the safe third 
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country concept as furthering the cooperation with third countries seems to hint on 
widening, rather than restricting the scope. 
 In a discussion paper for the Member States, the Estonian Presidency has 
requested for a further definition of ‘sufficient protection’, explaining that this 
definition in the Asylum Procedures Directive exceeds the requirements of the 
Refugee Convention in certain aspects, such as the right to family reunification 
(the Convention lacks this criteria) and the right to legal residence (the Convention 
mentions lawful stay). Also, the access to education and the labour market are 
less concretely formulated in the Convention.85 The President also wants to know 
to what extent Member States aim to further qualify the required connection 
between the asylum seeker and the third country, besides the proposal to require 
that the person has transited the country. It is to be seen if this discussion will 
remain limited within the criterion of transit, while certain Member States have 
already expressed their doubts if transit should be a requirement at all. The 
removal of this core element would pave the way to sending migrants to countries 
they never were before, which would perfectly fit in the political aim to send 
migrants who departed from Libya to Tunisia or Egypt. The Presidency also 
explicitly asks in the discussion paper if the concept should be applicable to 
certain parts of the territory of the third country. An agreement on this would 
feed into creating humanitarian zones in a third country that does not comply with 
international standards. Furthermore, the reasoning that criteria on a safe third 
country concept should be as minimal as possible, in order to leave space for 
agreements on protection standards with specific countries, is getting more and 
more support.86 That would strip immigration officers, lawyers and judges of any 
legal framework, creating legal uncertainty and divergent practices and case 
law. 
4.2. (North) African safe third countries 
The current negotiations on the Asylum Procedures Regulation, especially the 
foreseeable watering down of the criteria for the designation of a safe third 
country, will further pave the way to the adoption of the EU-Turkey model to 
other countries with even less safeguards for protection, reception and access to 
society. Political leaders have clearly shown an interest in concluding similar 
agreements with Tunisia, but also other countries of interest have their attention. 
Morocco and Tunisia however refuse to conclude a readmission agreement with 
the EU. Readmission to Tunisia of Tunisian citizens is already problematic, but the 
main concerns of Tunisia concern the readmission of third country nationals. In a 
joint non-paper, the Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS) 
                                         
85 Council of the EU, ‘Note: Proposal for the Regulation establishing a common procedure for 
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propose to make this clause more flexible, related to readmission agreements 
with sub-Saharan countries of origin, but also points at the Member States’ 
unwillingness to offer adequate mobility opportunities for Tunisian citizens.87 
However the constraints to the EU cooperation with Libya, has led to further 
pressure to conclude a migration deal on the Tunisian authorities by EU Member 
States like Germany and Italy, which are even prepared to link their support for 
Tunisia’s fight against terrorism to migration control and readmission.88 In 
response, NGOs released a joint statement that Tunisia does not qualify as safe 
given the lack of effective asylum legislation and adequate reception capacity.89 
In 2014, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and other NGOs, 
having ‘repeatedly expressed their concerns about the “mobility partnership” 
signed by the EU and Tunisia’, argued that: 
implementation of such agreement is particularly worrying in the current 
Tunisian transitional context where key institutions and legislative instruments 
needed to guarantee the respect of the rights of migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers are still lacking. The wording of the joint declaration (…) 
makes it clear that these rights are not a priority in the ‘partnership’.90 
Similarly, in its analysis of the EU–Morocco mobility partnership, the Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) expressed its ‘fears that actions 
to combat irregular migration immigration will be prioritised and implemented at 
the expense of other themes included in the partnership and, more worryingly, at 
the expense of the rights of migrants and refugees’.91 
 Some criticise the EU for attempting to engage in a cooperation with 
Egypt, as it would implicitly endorse the Egyptian regime and give it a 
‘considerable leverage to exploit the partnership and impose a very high price 
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Migration deals and responsibility sharing: can the two go together?  
 Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers - 2019/02 24 
tag’.92 Right after the tragedy ‘Rashid’ where 200 migrants had drowned in the 
Mediterranean (and the Egyptian authorities were blamed for their slow 
response), a representative of the Egyptian government sent a letter to all 
members of the European Parliament, where it recognized ‘the need to inject a 
greater sense of urgency to curtail [migration]’.93 This implicit invitation to 
cooperate on migration is considered as a way to use migration management for 
gaining funding as well as their much-needed international legitimacy.94 Indeed, 
Statewatch released a confidential document of EEAS including all options for 
cooperating with Egypt as a ‘sending, receiving and transit country for migrants’, 
notwithstanding the ‘important concerns about ensuring protection, livelihoods and 
access to services for refugees and migrants in Egypt, as well as ensuring the 
creation fully-fledged asylum and migration management systems compliant with 
international conventions and human rights’.95 
 Moreover, the potential use of (the number of) migrants by threatening to 
terminate the cooperation as a way to ensure that the money keeps coming, 
makes the EU vulnerable for blackmailing. The frequent references by president 
Erdogan to its migration deal with the EU illustrates how real these risks are, 
especially if national checks and balances are lacking. Creating safe zones in 
fragile or failed states or countries with repressive or corrupt regimes, the safety 
of refugees cannot be guaranteed from a distance, even if these zones would be 
protected with EU security forces. If those operations should be regarded as 
extraterritorial processing, the EU would be obliged to apply EU standards on 
their procedure and reception. That would also imply access to an EU Member 
State for those qualifying for an EU protection status. But even if it would be 
labelled as outsourcing, certain standards should be met, including the guarantee 
of resettlement once the need for protection is determined. Since June 2018 it 
has become clear that Member States insist on making resettlement of refugees 
conditional on cooperation with the EU’s migration agenda, and particularly on 
return. Although it will not be appealing for third countries (many demands and 
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a relatively small number of pledges), this conditionality would serve to 
undermine a useful resettlement plan and EU foreign policy more generally. 
5. EU asylum acquis :  a more equitable responsibility sharing? 
The external dimension of the EU asylum and migration policy has clearly 
creeped into the EU internal common asylum system, affecting its standards on 
access to protection. The current negotiations on the interpretation of the safe 
third country concept, may lead to a Regulation at odds with Article 78(1) of the 
TFEU, which requires the asylum acquis to be construed in line with the general 
economy and objectives of the Geneva Convention. The current practice already 
shows that the EU and its Member States seek to allocate their responsibility for 
protection to spontaneously arrived asylum seekers, while being reluctant to offer 
significant support for protection offered in third countries. The same imbalance 
can be seen in the external dimension of EU migration policy: despite the official 
aims of comprehensiveness, the emphasise is clearly on the prevention of irregular 
migration. And although third countries are often framed as unwilling, the EU lacks 
an openness to long-term reforms from which partner countries could structurally 
benefit. 
 The EU policy to combat irregular migration also has a regional impact on 
the willingness and capability to offer adequate protection. Funding may lead to 
enhanced protection, but the focus on border control and readmission also 
provokes harsher and more restrictive immigration policies. Third countries 
respond to the fear of becoming responsible for too many migrants, but the EU 
also encourages them to restrict their visa policy and strengthen their border 
controls. Hence, the EU policy focussed on avoiding protection responsibilities, is 
adopted by third countries as well. If third countries are funded to build asylum 
regimes, it is only a matter of time before they deploy the same safe third country 
concepts that the EU is negotiating now, especially if they feel disproportionally 
affected through the behaviour of the EU. The legitimisation of the stripped 
criteria on safe third country concept will thus affect the protection standards 
elsewhere, and the authority of UNHCR to intervene as well. 
The adoption of this excluding migration policy by countries of transit may also 
affect their regional co-operation, due to its repercussions for free movement 
regimes and flexible practises of border crossings for temporary protection. 
These actual and potential consequences at the regional level may be unintended 
by the EU, but they can undermine its objective to enhance regional cooperation 
and mobility. It goes without saying that this regional impact will impede the 
aimed enhancement of the regional protection regimes. The latter is however 
framed by the Union as the main alternative for granting access to protection on 
the EU territory. 
 The tendency to exclude migrants from protection avenues on the EU 
territory through the accumulation of its internal and external migration policy, 
will further shift the responsibility for refugees to third countries. But it may 
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therefore have a detrimental impact on the protection regimes in third countries 
and on the willingness to solve protection needs in a regional cooperation. As this 
puts the aim of a more equitable sharing of responsibility at risk, the EU’s policy 
seems not well thought through on its consequences for the long term and the 
global level. Instead of more, we may face less solidarity. But also less arguments 
for the EU to credibly promote international solidarity. 
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